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In February 1942, barely two months after he had declared war on the United States, Adolf Hitler praised America's great industrial achievements and admitted that Germany would need some time to catch up. The Americans, he said, had shown the way in developing the most efficient methods of production—especially in iron and coal, which formed the basis of modern industrial civilization. He also touted America's superiority in the field of transportation, particularly the automobile. He loved automobiles and saw in Henry Ford a great hero of the industrial age. Hitler's personal train was even code-named "Amerika."
In Hitler and America, historian Klaus P. Fischer seeks to understand more deeply how Hitler viewed America, the nation that was central to Germany's defeat. He reveals Hitler's split-minded image of America: America and Amerika. Hitler would loudly call the United States a feeble country while at the same time referring to it as an industrial colossus worthy of imitation. Or he would belittle America in the vilest terms while at the same time looking at the latest photos from the United States, watching American films, and amusing himself with Mickey Mouse cartoons. America was a place that Hitler admired—for the can-do spirit of the American people, which he attributed to their Nordic blood—and envied—for its enormous territorial size, abundant resources, and political power. Amerika, however, was to Hitler a mongrel nation, grown too rich too soon and governed by a capitalist elite with strong ties to the Jews.
Across the Atlantic, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had his own, far more realistically grounded views of Hitler. Fischer contrasts these with the misconceptions and misunderstandings that caused Hitler, in the end, to see only Amerika, not America, and led to his defeat.
- Sales Rank: #1754301 in eBooks
- Published on: 2011-05-26
- Released on: 2011-05-26
- Format: Kindle eBook
Review
"Hitler and America is an extraordinary book, chock-full of evidence and significant details about the complexity (and in some ways, the duality) of Hitler's consideration of the United States."—John Lukacs, author of The Hitler of History
About the Author
Klaus P. Fischer is Professor of History and Philosophy at Allan Hancock College and the author of Nazi Germany: A New History and History of an Obsession: German Judeophobia and the Holocaust.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Introduction
A book about Hitler and America? The brief title calls for an explanation. Half a dozen books have been written about Hitler and the United States, most of them dealing with German-American foreign policy between 1933 (the year Hitler came to power) and 1941 (the year he declared war on the United States). Diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States between 1933 and 1941 should, of course, play an important role in any discussion of Hitler and America, but not at the expense of exploring the origins and development of Hitler's views. Many things in America during the 1930s caught his attention and influenced his decisions. They include American isolationism; the activities of Nazi sympathizers in America, especially the German-American Bund; American public opinion; American Jewish reactions to anti-Semitic events in Germany; and American-German business connections. Did Hitler have rigid prejudices against the United States that he never modified? Or did his perceptions change over time? Historians who have dealt with the subject of Hitler and the United States have often argued that Hitler was either ignorant or misinformed about America.
I hope that mine may be a fresh approach to this subject. It is now more than sixty years ago that Hitler committed suicide in his bunker beneath the Reich chancellery, sufficient time to permit us to assess his intentions with a greater degree of clarity than was possible a generation ago. The vast amount of material now available may be sufficient to fill out the record on almost any aspect of World War II. It is highly unlikely that many "new" documents will be found. What may be valuable now are reconsiderations of certain crucial issues.
One of these issues is Hitler's view of America and its role in world affairs. Most historians have argued that Hitler did not pay any attention to the United States in the 1930s, that if he thought of America at all, he did so through the prism of his ideology, which necessarily compromised his vision. Many have claimed that Hitler felt contempt for Americans because they were a mongrel people, incapable of higher culture or great creative achievements. Yet Hitler had considerable respect for the industrial power of the United States and its people's capacity for work. Whatever his distorted perceptions may have been, it is wrong to think that Hitler paid no attention to the United States. Indeed, he was better informed about political developments in America than has been customarily assumed.
Hitler did not want a war with either Britain or the United States; he believed that he could achieve his continental ambitions without drawing them into a direct confrontation. He hoped that his reach for hegemony in Europe would not have to lead to the loss of empire for the British. What did he think America would do if he dragged Britain and France—America's allies in World War I—into a general European war? Hitler hoped that the United States, militarily unprepared and officially neutral, would not intervene before he won his, necessarily short, European war. People close to Hitler said that he had everything calculated beforehand (hat jede Möglichkeit von vornherein einkalkuliert). He did have a very astute judgment of his opponents and a fine sense of timing. Yet a major (and perhaps the prime) cause of his defeat was the power of the United States. Another cause was the greater tenacity of the Russian soldier as compared to the German soldier; yet another was the staying power of the British. In fighting against the three greatest powers in the world, Hitler had overextended himself, but—like Frederick the Great—he still hoped that the unnatural American-Russian-British alliance ranged against him would break up sooner or later. Hitler's efforts to split this unnatural alliance have received insufficient treatment by historians. In 1934 Hitler's chief deputy, Rudolf Hess, told a cheering mass of party members at Nuremberg that Germany was Hitler, and Hitler was Germany. This accolade was an extreme expression of faith in the führer's leadership. Yet many Germans believed that Hitler embodied the will of the nation and that his decisions reflected their true interests. The recent German historian Klaus Hildebrand declared that "one must not speak of National Socialism but of Hitlerism." If Hildebrand intends this to mean that the movement we associate with National Socialism is unthinkable without Hitler, he is wrong. Ideas about National Socialism existed well before Hitler ever became active in politics. What Hitler did was to give voice to beliefs, frustrations, hopes, and grievances in a way that no German politician had been able to before (or has been able to since). His ability to appeal to a large number of Germans and to persuade them that they could become a great power became reality in 1940. Hitler needed the Germans for the fulfillment of his conception of German greatness, but the Germans did not really need him to be great. The Germans are an old people with a long historical memory, which more often than not has failed them when they have given in to one of their main weaknesses, that of rendering unconditional loyalty to their leaders. Yet they have survived even the worst of them, including Hitler, who admitted on one occasion, "A man once told me: 'listen, if you do that Germany will be ruined in six weeks.' I said: 'The German people once survived the wars with the Romans. The German people survived the people's migrations (Völkerwanderung). The German people survived the great wars of the early and later Middle Ages. The German people survived the wars of religion of the modern age. The German people survived the Napoleonic wars, the wars of liberation, even a world war and a revolution—they will also survive me.'"
When Hitler purportedly said that either Germany would be a world power or there would be no Germany, he was almost but fortunately not quite right. The German people gave him their support to the very end—a remarkable loyalty if one considers the extent of the suffering he had visited upon his nation by that time. This subject of German loyalty to Hitler has still not been sufficiently explained, least by the Germans themselves. Here my purpose is to remind the reader that for a long time Hitler justly saw himself as speaking for the majority of the German people. The notion of Hitler as an unpopular tyrant is misleading. The majority of the German people cheered him on during his triumphs, and they stood by him, for the most part, to the very end.
When Hitler spoke for Germany he therefore spoke with the support of his people in a way that few leaders of other nations could claim. But if Hitler spoke for the Germans, was there anyone who spoke with the same force and credibility for the United States? The title of this book, after all, is Hitler and America. Did Franklin D. Roosevelt speak for America with the same popular support that Hitler did in Germany? Roosevelt was elected to the presidency four times, a unique event in America before or since, but his powers were not like Hitler's. Roosevelt faced considerable opposition in Congress and among isolationists throughout the nation. The economic crisis, which had brought him into office, went on in varying degrees of intensity well into the early 1940s, restricting a more active foreign policy backed by great military power. He was also fenced in by strict neutrality laws that were carefully monitored by vocal isolationists who did not want the United States militarily involved in any shape or form in Europe.
Thus, when Roosevelt spoke, he did so in very careful terms, aware as he was of various strong countercurrents in the form of popular opinion, congressional opposition, press criticism, or even dissension within his own administration. Hitler obviously had a freer hand than Roosevelt had. Still, Roosevelt must be considered the most important voice of the United States during this twelve-year period, but not at the expense of other voices or forces in America. For this reason alone, the book is not principally about Hitler versus Roosevelt, even though their contrast is unavoidable.
Hitler was well aware of the importance of Congress and of American political parties. He knew the machinery of democracy; after all, his rise to power took place within the democratic multiparty system of the Weimar Republic. Following his failed coup in Munich in 1923, which resulted in his imprisonment at Landsberg, he decided to reestablish his party and destroy the Weimar Republic using its own weapon of majority rule. He had plenty of time while he was in prison to plot his strategy. After 1924 the mission of the party was to exploit the methods of democracy to destroy democracy. This obliged Hitler, among other things, to monitor public opinion carefully, because one of the surest ways to power in a democratic system was to capture the hearts and minds of the people. Hitler knew that Americans were particularly susceptible to public opinion, which could be manipulated by the press and other mass media.
Although Hitler knew little about the American media, suspecting that it was under the control of Jewish interests, he realized its importance in influencing public policy. He was particularly interested in isolationist sentiments in America, and he thought about ways and means by which Germany could reinforce the isolationists. This interest has a direct bearing on this book, namely, what were the things about America that Hitler really wanted to know? The question he probably asked himself was, "How might the United States become a serious obstacle to the expansion of German power in Europe?" He thought that U.S. involvement in Europe was highly unlikely as long as its political and economic interests were not directly threatened. Hitler knew that the United States had tipped the scales in favor of the allied powers in World War I. Would history repeat itself? What could he do to keep America out of European affairs?
Throughout the 1920s, long before Hitler became chancellor, the United States was in relative isolation. The Senate had refused to ratify the Versailles treaty and join the League of Nations, thereby depriving that institution of the support it needed to enforce the peace settlement and prevent future wars. It had fallen to the Western democracies, chiefly Britain and France, to support and enforce the peace settlement that just about every German politician wanted to revise or undermine. British and French statesmen knew that in case of conflict with Germany over the provisions of the Versailles treaty, they could expect little save moral support from the United States. Some historians have concluded that Hitler knew this and decided that he could ignore the United States. Yet behind the Western democracies—at least potentially—loomed the American giant. Americans were always interested in supporting the cause of democracy in Europe. At what point would the United States take a more active role in Europe? Hitler knew that this depended on how German hegemony in Europe would develop. Once France was defeated, what would England do? Perhaps negotiate with him.
As this book illustrates, Hitler tried to calculate when the United States would take concrete actions such as supplying his opponents with armaments or even direct military intervention. He turned to certain people who could tell him the truth about America. Hitler had few trusted advisers who could furnish reliable information about what he called the "gigantic American State Colossus." Of his early followers, only two had firsthand knowledge of the United States: Kurt Lüdecke and Ernst "Putzi" Hanfstaengl. Lüdecke was a footloose and opportunistic young follower who had gone to America in 1924 to drum up wealthy donors for the party. Hanfstaengl was the son of a well-to-do Munich art dealer who had established a branch of the Munich business on Fifth Avenue in New York. Hanfstaengl's father sent him to Harvard, where he met Franklin Roosevelt, and then encouraged him to manage the New York branch of the family business. Putzi Hanfstaengl's role in serving Hitler and freely offering advice on America is treated at length in the following pages. Hitler had several other America "experts" he periodically consulted after becoming chancellor: his commanding officer in the List regiment in World War I, Fritz Wiedemann, who spent time in America in the l930s; Colin Ross, the well-known German globetrotter and author of popular travel books; and General Friedrich von Bötticher, the only German military attaché who served in Washington, D.C., from 1933 to 1941. There were others who periodically informed Hitler about America, including Joachim Ribbentrop, his foreign minister, and various diplomatic officials, notably Hans Luther, Hans Dieckhoff, Ernst von Weizsäcker, and Hans Thomsen.
Compared to Franklin Roosevelt,who had firsthand knowledge and experience of Germany and Europe, Hitler was at a considerable disadvantage. He had limited travel experience and spoke no foreign languages. Whatever travels Hitler undertook were dictated by political, or later military, circumstances. In early 1933 Roosevelt invited Hitler to America to discuss economic issues. Hitler declined, sending his economic minister, Hjalmar Schacht, in his place. It is interesting to speculate what these two leaders would have discovered about each other and how this might have changed their relationship. Often Hitler deliberately avoided face-to-face meetings with his major adversaries. Perhaps this is why he did not go to Washington or later to Moscow. He also deliberately turned down a meeting with Winston Churchill that Hanfstaengl had arranged in Munich in 1932. Hitler had a tendency to refrain from contact with people who held opposing views. The company of first-rate intellects made him uneasy; it brought out insecurities that stemmed from his obscure social origins in Austria. He frequently compensated for these insecurities through aggressive posturing or displays of his technical knowledge. Historians have had no trouble collecting many strange statements made by Hitler, including some about America and Americans. But this should not blind us to his brilliant political skills, including his ability to think and act pragmatically. He was far more unpredictable than historians have reported. Ernst Weizsäcker, state secretary in the Foreign Office, said that it was difficult to "see through" Hitler (schwer zu durchschauen) because he had an astonishing gift for dissimulation, making it difficult to tell whether he believed his own rhetoric or merely played a role, which he varied to fit particular people or occasions. Historians must be extremely careful when trying to distinguish between rhetoric and conviction, between Hitler's visionary idealism and his brutal realism. In the case of America, he often employed the worst distortions, calling the United States a feeble country with a loud mouth while at the same time referring to it as an industrial colossus worthy of being imitated. He could belittle America in the vilest terms while at the same time eagerly looking at the latest photos from America, watching American films, and amusing himself with Mickey Mouse cartoons.
I intend to provide a more detailed and balanced account of Hitler's view of the United States than the few older accounts we have on this subject. So many Hitler studies leave us feeling uncertain about the man's character and convictions. Often the more we probe, the more elusive Hitler seems to become. He once told his close entourage that if he succeeded in his great plans, his name would be praised throughout the ages, but if he failed, his name would be cursed. Since the first possibility did not occur, we do not know whether it would have resulted in the apotheosis of the führer. It is highly unlikely. The fact that he failed led to exactly the outcome he feared; his name has not only been cursed but is associated with the embodiment of evil in history. Historians are unlikely to revise the stereotype that reduces Hitler to a villainous character in a cheap melodrama. For the sake of historical accuracy, however, it is important to steer clear of the snare of reductionism, of reducing all of Hitler's actions to some common demonic denominator. No one is evil personified, except the devil, and even if someone were, it would not follow that such a person could not be extraordinarily gifted or brilliant. For historians, a degree of detachment, open-mindedness, and the awareness of existential contingencies are necessary elements in viewing the past.
Hitler was not a noble character. He was malignantly destructive. For this reason, Joachim Fest, citing an ancient dictum, denied that Hitler was a great hero, because repulsive moral beings are unfit to be called either great or heroic. Although Hitler may not have been a hero, he was a political genius who fundamentally shaped the twentieth century. His grandiose visions of establishing a Greater German Reich almost came to fruition in 1941. His hope was to match the industrial power of the United States, for in all other respects he thought that Germany was already superior. How he planned to do so, and what he thought of the United States, its people, leadership, culture, and way of life, is the subject of the following story. In this regard, it is important to mention that the book has deliberately been cast in narrative form because of my strong conviction that history is a storytelling art form rather than a social science that must imitate the natural sciences. All too many books about history nowadays are little more than retrospective sociology, front-loaded with theories and academic fads that are outmoded as soon as the books roll off the presses. I have a story to tell about Hitler and America, and I invite the reader to follow me through the narrative with as little distraction as possible. I believe that the narrative itself has cognitive value. Readers can make up their minds from the story itself, from the way I have cast it and from the explanations embedded in it. My own position about Hitler's split image of America/Amerika serves as a guiding theme and is summarized at length in the conclusion. Along the way, readers will find surprising and even disturbing material about Hitler, Roosevelt, and the German-American relationship.
Most helpful customer reviews
14 of 16 people found the following review helpful.
How Hitler viewed America
By Paul Gelman
Most books which were written so far about Hitler and America deal with a number of aspects, such as the foreign relations between the two countries. But there have been only few of them which raised the question posed in Professor Fischer'r book, namely: how did Hitler see America or its leaders?
Many historians have claimed that Hitler hardly paid any attention to the USA in the 1930s. others added that the Fuhrer had only contempt for the Americans, whom he considered a mongrel people, incapable of a higher culture. These and many other theories are dispelled by this excellent and extremely well researched book which proves to what extent America was essential in Hitler's politics. He had a split image of America: on the one hand, he would belittle the American people, but on the other hand he had a lot of respect for their technological achievements as well as their industrial and organizational methods. He, for example, admired American techniques of advertising and had them embodied in Nazi appeals to the German people. Hitler also envied the power of America and hoped one day to equal it through conquests of living space in the East.
The first chapter shows that what Hiler knew about America, the "split-image", came from second-hand sources, from visitors there, such as Putzi Hanfstaengel, from the books of Karl May and other lesser known authors, of from what he saw in films, magazines and newspapers. He also gained some insight about the military preparedness of the Americans with the help of Friedrich von Botticher, who was the military attache in Washington.
Since this book is also about the way Roosevelt viewed Hitler, there are fascinating insights on this topic as well. FDR learned from his ambassador to Berlin that Hitler and his regime were becoming dangerous by the end of the thirties, especially after the secret conference held on November 5, 1937, when Hitler explained to the attendants there that his aims were to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia in order to secure Germany's eastern and southern flanks.
Professor Fischer does not attach great importance to the American-German Bund, led by Fritz Kuhn ,who was actually despised by the Fuhrer.
The following years, at least up to December 1941, were characterized by efforts made by Roosevelt to magnify the Nazi threat, for he wanted to convert the American people to an interventionist course. The president claimed that Hitler wanted to destroy America through an inside-job, sowing the seeds of suspicion, distrust and subversion.
Hitler regarded Roosevelt as a president surrounded by Jews, those people whom he, Hitler, hoped to exterminate forever after 1941. The available evidence suggests that Roosevelt knew about the final solution, but he did not know much, if anything, about it in detail, nor did he know what to do about it other than win the war.
Another point emphasized in the book concerns the attempts of Hitler to sow discord among the Allies, hoping that Roosevelt and Churchill, for instance, would end their friendship. Hitler believed that if a man other that Roosevelt had been president, he might have kept the United States out of the war and employed more effective economic remedies to cure the country of the Depression.
In contrast, Roosevelt saw the war as a moral clash between humane values of American democracy and the brutal nature of Nazi tyranny. The four freedoms doctrine of his was an attempt to universalize the doctrines of the Enlightment on which the American political experience had rested, while Hitler had a warped image of America, which was moulded by questionable sources which he bent to fit his own ideological frame of reference. This is why Hitler dismissed the American population as an international mishmash of peoples.
I would like to make one point about some chapters of this very important book.These contain an analysis of the relationship between the Big Three: Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill. The connection between them and the way Hitler saw America is not always clear. However, this does not detract an iota from this book's importance and deep analysis about the was the Nazi dictator regarded the USA. In fact, the superb way the book is written only proves that some professional historians still know how to write a narrative-cum-analytical history in an extraordinary serious, readable yet entertaining way.
3 of 7 people found the following review helpful.
Hitler and Roosevelt: 1933 to 1945
By Virginia C. Hughes
Fischer's nine chapter hardcover book takes the reader on a journey through Hitler's and Roosevelt's years in power and offer's each other's philosophies on their opposing nations. Diplomatic strategies are also a mainstay of this work during the war years with the great powers of Russia, Great Britain, and Japan. Fischer utilizes his own extensive research more so than extraneous quotes from key players of the period. Similarities and differences of the two leaders are discussed early on and they are striking. They both came to power the same year and both died the same year. They both had innate understandings of ordinary people's concerns in society and knew how to motivate the masses. Differences included some of the following: FDR had spent considerable time in Germany in his younger years where Hitler had never visited America but relied on newspapers, films, and diplomatic reports from German cells. Hitler capitalized on the German cult of the masses which was racial and ethnic superiority and distinction as opposed to equal rights stamped in democracy in America. Germans were forced into Nazi beliefs where Americans valued individualism, freedom, and equality. In Germany, the volk moved as one; the individual status was virutally nonexistent. Another important distinction Fischers emphasizes is the rise to power. FDR came up through the ranks of political office and ivy league education and joined a party well established by the fall of 1932. Hitler boasts to have had transitioned the German Workers Party into his own NAZI party with little more than a sixth grade education being denied acceptance to the Vienna Academy of Arts. Hitlers montra was obstinate ideology and brutality; FDR supported his democratic principles promoting peace and prosperity for all. He was also adamant that Germany surrender unconditionally in WWII and believed the masses never thought they lost the great war precipitating the rise to a totalitarian regime in 1933. Hitler isolated himself as the military leader rarely taking advice from his generals and left the business of running Germany the nation to subordinates of the SS creating a competitive frenzy. FDR followed the constitution in carrying out his administrative duties.
Fischer points out that Hitler had a split vision of America. On the one hand she was successful from an industrial point of view. Hitler greatly admired the Ford enterprise of automobiles and was in awe of the many skyscrapers in new york city. From a cultural point of view he felt Germany surpassed America with its operas, music and art. Part of Americas success in industry and science came from the Nordic people who emigrated there from the east. Hitler believed Americas downfall would be the result of a melting pot of peoples and especially jews who manipulated FDR into entering the war. From Fischer's perspective Hitler did not want America to enter the war and quickly quelled any actions of provoking America early on. Hitler knew from a personal experience that the United States entry into WWI led to demise of the Central powers. It is evident that Hitler feared America's might while at the same time regarded Americans as inferior to Germans. But then again, everyone in Hitler's mind was inferior to Aryans.
Fisher also emphasizes the German-American rallies held at none other than Madison square garden to promote German culture and ideology. It was interesting that Hitler clung to his beliefs in stating that these rallies carry little importance as his vision was reserved just for his German people not German Americans living abroad. In other words, Nazism was an exclusive club. As is pointed out in other books, Hitler was bent on acquiring living space for the German people, which as he planned would come from the east; these plans were finally quelled in Stalingrad. Fischer also points out the many opportunities for peace Hitler and his entourage entertained from 1941 on as late in that year even Hitler believed the war was not winnable. There were many political scenarios between Russia, Great Britain and the US, the latter two especially fearing Stalin would make a pact with Germany. Stalin played the game on numerous occasions to garner military hardware from the west. The author contends that Hitler was well aware of attempts at peace deals on all fronts; but that the war was lost on his own miscalulations and delusions of grandeur of a future empire that simply could not be sustained by present german resources. Hitler never seriously entertained peace negotiations but chose as Fischer points out to hold ground and keep up the fight against communism and for his national socialism policies. He was also betting on one of the allies bowing out. He never accepted resonsibility for the impending defeat but chose to blame the volk. His physicial deterioration is described and Speer's assessment of being a shriveled up old man isolating himself in a dismal bunker and giving orders on fictitious military maneuvers and army regiments which no longer existed. Other's have attributed his poor decisions to his embodiment of hatred and split personality of brutality on one hand and consideration for others on another, and also being overmedicated. These views are all described vividly in the book. FDR did not live to hear Germany surrender unconditionally nor did he serve out his fourth term. His political genuius, diplomacy and principles however, helped to secure a favorable outcome for the allies. The thinking and strategies employed by both sides are of great interest and not highlighted in other books of this period, i.e. if Hitler aligned with Stalin they could conquer Europe or the United States would never enter the war because they have no stake in europe and are isolationists when it comes to european wars. The author offers plausible but not conclusive reasons why Hitler let the british forces go at Dunkirk; this inaction highlights Hitlers hesitation and inability to effectively implement military actions. As many scholars have commented, he was a political genius, not a military one and did not heed the advice of the military experts around him. Being the only President elected to a fourth term, FDR was an effective leader; Hitler came in like a meteor taking everyone and everything in his path with him, a solitary man on a solitary journey whose inner core was never truly revealed. An indication of how dedicated he was to his ideology is he likely could have conquered all of Europe if he had utilized all of the people, non Aryans, he imprisoned and liquidated; but such a move would have been in violation of his political policies and doctrine. That being said, ideology/beliefs in the realm of biocracy and eugenics came before so called living space.
3 of 5 people found the following review helpful.
Somewhat Misleading Title
By Lesmok
Although early in the book the author spends some time documenting Hitler's perceptions of America and Roosevelt's perceptions of Germany, his primary focus is the relationship between Stalin and FDR. Albeit Fischer does focus on the collaboration and tensions between Washington and Moscow regarding wartime strategy and postwar policy towards Germany.
Admittedly towards the end of the book the author veers back to German hopes and strategies to break up Stalin and the Anglo-Americans, he remains fixated on the personalities of Roosevelt and Stalin, with relatively little perspective from the German point of view.
Those interested in the title subject would be better serviced by Patrick Hearden's 'Roosevelt Confronts Hitler' or Holger Helwig's "Politics of Frustation"
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